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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the changing cyclical variability of economic
activity in the United States. It first shows that the decline in variability
since World War II cannot be explained by changes in the composition of economic
activity or by the avoidance of financial panics. We then show that increased
automatic stabilization by the government, and the increased availability of
private credit after World War II combined to stabilize consumption and reduce
the variability of aggregate demand. The main argument of the paper holds that
greater price rigidity in recent times may have contributed to economic stabil-
ity by preventing destabilizing deflations and inflations. Empirical evidence










(617) 495—2447Perhaps the most striking feature of business cycles is that
their amplitude varies widely from era to era and from country to country.
While there do seem to be striking regularities in the pattern of covaria—
tion exhibited by variables connected with the business cycle, there are
large changes in the magnitude of the cycle itself. These differences in
cyclical variation should properly be a subject of study by economists.
The existence of these differences suggests that "universal" models
of business cycles——models which neglect institutional determinants of.
business cycle behavior——will not be adequate to explain the phenomenon
of the business cycle.
This paper extends discussions by Burns (1960) and Baily
(1978) of the changing extent of cyclical variability in the American
economy. We seek to link this changing variability to changing institutional
factors. In the process, we are led to a view of the role of price flexi-
bility in cyclical fluctuations which, while consistent with Keynes's own
views, diverges sharply from the views characteristic both of modern
Keynesians and of classical macro—economists of the new and old schools.
Our paper begins with an examination of the extent of cyclical
variability over different parts of the 1893—1982 period. Using a variety
of measures of variability and several different statistical techniques,
clear evidence emerges that the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations is much
lower after than it was before World War II. This result holds even if
the Great Depression is excluded from the pre—World War II sample period.
—1—There is weak evidence that output shocks have had more persistence
in the post—World War II than in the pre—Worid War II period. This casts
doubt on the hypothesis that the successful application of discretionary
stabilization policy is a significant cause of improved post—World War II
macro—economic performance. A number of structural explanations for this
phenomenon, including the declining role of agriculture, the increasing
role of government, and the declining share of investment, have been suggested.
Our examination of the data indicates that only the increasing role of
government can account for even a small part of thedecline in the cyclical
variability of output and employment that is observed when the pre—and post
World War II periods are compared.
A clear distinction between the patterns of pre— and post—World
War II data is the larger size of aggregate demand shocks during theearlier
interval. We attribute this to two factors. First, the growth of government
between the two eras led to significant changes in the relationshipbetween
disposable income and GNP. The existence of a large and progressivetax
system in the post—World War II period tended to mitigatecyclical fluctua-
tions in disposable income. This effect was accentuated by the growthof
counter—cyclical entitlement programs, such as unemploymentinsurance.
But large fluctuations in disposable income do not necessarilyhave any
consequences for the behavior of aggregatedemand if all consumers can
borrow and lend freely. Hence the importance of the second majorfactor:
a decline in the fraction of consumptionaccounted for by liquidity—constrained
-households.Growth in the availability of consumer credit of various
types led to a reduction in the numberof consumers who were forced to cut
back their consumption as a result of transitory declinesin asposable
income. These two factors combined to substantiallyreduce the Keynesian
—2—multiplier,-'and therefore to enhance stability.
Most of the major institutional changes in the economy during this
century have had the effect of making the economy less "Wairasian." Both
the size of the government and the extent of government regulation have
increased markedly. Labor and product markets have become more concentrated
with the growth to significance of unions and conglomerates. The attachment
between workers and firms was less and wage flexibility was greater in
magnitude before World War II than it has been after. In sum, the pre—
World War II economy was much closer to the perfectly competitive, atomistic
ideal of economic theory than was the post—World War II economy.
Conventional macro—economic theory of both the Keynesian and
classical variety suggests that macro—economic performance should have been
better in the pre-Worid War II economy because it was relatively free of
institutional rigidities and imperfections. Yet this was not the case.
We raise the possibility that the increasing institutionalization of the
economy may have contributed to macro—economic stability by preventing
destabilizing deflations, and by facilitating private arrangements to smooth
production and employment. This possibility, noted by Keynes, has been
largely ignored by both American Keynesian and classicalmacro—economistS.'
The much greater cyclical variance in real interest rates observed in the
pre—World War II period is a piece of evidence in favor of this alternative
hypothesis. Further evidence on the importance of this Keynes effect in
explaining the changing character of the business cycle is provided by
-aninvestigation of vector auto—regression systems.
1/Blanchard (1981) concludes that in America today there is essentially
no multiplier.
2/A prominent exception is Tobin (1975).
—3—The paper is organized as follows: Section I profiles the
changing size of cyclical fluctuations over the 1893—1982 period. Section II
discusses the role of stabilization policies maccounting for the decline
in output variability in the post—War period. Section III examines the
relationship between the "Walrasian" character if the economy, price
flexibility and output flexibility. Section IV discusses a number of sources
of evidence suggesting that the increasing institutionalization of the
economy may have contributed to economic stability. Section Voffers a
short restatement of our conclusions.
—4—I. THE CHANGING CYCLICAL VARIABILITY OF OUTPUT
Thesharp reduction in the size of cyclical fluctuations in output
and employment between the pre— and post—World War II periods has been
noted many times. In his amazingly prescient 1959 Presidential Address to the
American Economic Association Arthur Burns noted that "its [the business
cycle's] impact on the lives and fortunes of individuals has been substan-
tially reduced in our generation.... There is no parallel for such a sequence
of mild —orsuch a sequence of brief contractions, at least during the past
hundred years in our own country." Figures 1 and 2 respectively plot the
rate of change of annual GNP and the percentage deviation of GNP from trend
over the 1893—1982 period. They show clearly the declining variability of
real output.
An indication of the magnitude of the decline in cyclical variability
is provided by a comparison of the peak to trough decline in output between
pre— and post—War recessions as defined by the NBER chronology. During the
post—War period, the median decline was 0.2 percent and the maximum decline
was 1.8 percent during the 1973—1975 recession. During the 1893—1940 period
the median decline was 3.8 percent and the maximum decline was 37 percent
between 1929 and l933.' Similar conclusions are obtained using data on
employment or industrial production. For example, the median decline from
peak to trough in industrial production was 12 percent during the 1893—1940
period compared to a maximum decline in industrial production of 9 percent
-duringthe post—War period.
A somewhat more systematic examination of the changing variability
of GNP is presented in Table 1. Three alternative measuresQ.f variability
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—7—Table 1
The Changing Cyclical Variability of Output
b C
Period Ay _____ 'trend
1893—1915 .046 .061 .087
1893—1915/23—40 .044 .118 .138
1923—1940 .041 .142 .160
1947—1982 .011 .034 .046
1947—1970 .011 .036 .037
1971—1982 .011 .027 .051
Note: All calculations are based on GNP data described in Gordon (l982a).
a. Standard deviation of the quarter—to—quarter change inthe log
of real GNP.
b. Standard deviation of the difference between the log of real GNP
and the log of natural real GNP.
c. Standard deviation of the difference between the logof real GNP
andits piecewise—linear trend (breakpoints at 1915, 1922, 1940,
1946, and 1970).
—8—are used. The first is the standard deviation of the growth rate of quarterly
GNP as estimated by Gordon (1982 a). The second is the standard deviation
of the output gap as estimated using Gordon's natural GNP estimates. The
third measure is the standard deviation of the residuals when a continuous
piecewise—exponential trend is fit through the GNP series. Estimates of
volatility over a number of sub—intervals are presented. The 1915—1918 and
1941—46 periods are omitted because of the special effects of wars on economic
activity. We also omit the four year aftermath of World War I because rapid
inflation and subsequent deflation make this period uncharacteristic of
the remaining Mierican economic experience.
Regardless of which volatility measure is used, the conclusion is
that output was more variable before World War II than after it. By all
three measures output variability was about three times as great in the
earlier interval. Surprisingly, the much ballyhooed increase in economic
turbulence during the l970s barely shows up in the data. Apparently, the
1970s were turbulent only in comparison to the remarkably placid 1960s.
The data on the 1893—1915 period make it clear that the greater volatility
of output during the pre—War period was not just a reflection of the Depres-
sion. However, using either measure of volatility in the level of GNP there
is a noticeable increase in volatility between the 1893—1915 and the 1923—
1940 subperiods. This is wholly a consequence of the protracted downturn
in output represented by the Depression. No increase in the standard de-
viation of GNP changes appears because this measure places more weight on
high frequency fluctuations.
There remain the questions of whether the declining.sariabilitY
in real GNP documented in Table 1 is statistically significant, and whether
—9—it reflects a decrease in the amount of statistical noise in the GNP figures,
rather than a real change. Neither possibility seems very likely to us.
It is not clear how one should go about determining the statistical
significance of the differences shown in Table 1. Output movements are ser-
ially correlated and all tests of significance require some explicit model
of the process generating output. We will simply note that if successive
observations are treated as independent normal random variables, then the
hypothesis that the variance in output is constant can be rejected at a
level of confidence of less than .1 percent for annual data and .01 percent
for quarterly data.
It is certainly true that the GNP data——particularly for 1893 to 1915——
are somewhat shaky. Gordon's quarterly data series is based on annual
estimates originally constructed by Kuznets and Kendrick. Kuznets, at least,
did not regard his data for the period before 1919 with confidence. He
sought to divert people into studying his estimates in the formof five— or
ten—year moving averages, and he was reluctant to publishhis annual estimates.
It seems likely, however, that the deficiencies in the data lead us to
underestimate rather than overestimate the extent of cyclical variation in
the pre—World War I economy. The original annual estimates assume thatthe
relation between commodity production and GNP before 1909 is the same asthe
mean relation from 1919 to 1939. The estimates thus damp out independent
variation in services and transportation that is uncorrelated with commodity
production. Moreover, a recent reworking of the commodity productionfigures
that underlie these estimates suggests that the original annualestimates
give too high values to investment during the exceptionallYdpressed 1890's
and thus generate estimates for business cycle variancethat are toosma1i.'
4/See the appendices to Kuznets (1961).
5/See the appendices to Lewis (1978).
—10—On balance, we are led to conclude that the decline in the size of economic
fluctuations between the pre— and post—World War II periods is a real
phenomenon, a phenomenon that economists should be able to explain.
Accounting Explanations
One natural starting place in an investigation of the declining
volatility of GNP is to look separately at its different components. Perhaps
output has become more stable over time because the stable components
in GNP have grown relative to the unstable ones. In particular, government——
which is a—cyclic——has grown greatly in importance over the last century.
and agriculture, which is notoriously unstable, has shrunk rapidly as a
share of GNP.-' It has also been suggested that the share of durable goods
in GNP has declined over time. Since the demand for durable goods is
volatile, this is also a potential explanation for the decline in the
volatility of GI'JP.
Table 2 presents some evidence on these issues. It does not appear
that the changing composition of GNP can account for most of the decline
in the magnitude of output fluctuations. The percentage variability in
year—to—year changes in our estimate of private non—farm GNP declined by
56 percent between 1893—1940 and 1947—1982 compared to 67 percent for total
GNP. The variance of non—agricultural GNP is only slightly less than the
variance in total GNP, even in the 1893—1915 period. This somewhat surprising
result occurs because the value of agricultural products demanded is
actually slightly less variable than all other commodity groups except for
non—agricultural perishables. The increased decline in the relative variability
6/This idea is a relatively recent one. In the 1949 conference thatis
the ancestor of this one, Kuznets referred to the neat coincidenceof
the simultaneous rise of a—cyclic services and decline of a—cyclic
agriculture. See Simon Kuznets, "Comment," onJoseph A. Schuinpeter
"Historical Approach to Business Cycles," in Anderson (1951).
—11—of total GNP is due primarily to the rise of government purchases, which
go from approximately 5 percent of GNP in 1900 to approximately15 percent
of GNP today. Government purchases exert a stabilizing influence in Table 2
because the measure of variability used (year—to—year changes)
filters out the massive swings in government expenditure in the post—World
War II period associated with military purchases which occur at longerthan
business cycle frequences.
The last column of Table 2 shows that the standard deviationof
annual percentage changes in consumption has declined dramatically from
5.5 percent in the 1893—1940 period to 1.8 percent in the post—War period.
This development occurred despite a substantial increase —detailedin the Gordon
and Veitch paper in this volume —inthe share of consumer durables in con-
sumption between the two periods. This suggeststhat the decreasing share
of durable goods in GNP cannot account for a large part ofthe decline in
the variance in output fluctuations. Moreover, the paper byGordon and Veitch
in this volume shows that if consumer durables areincluded then there has
been no secular downwards trend in the share of GNPattributable to investment.
We have also examined a number of breakdowns of GNP by component
including its industrial composition and thestandard national income account-
ing breakdown into consumption, investment, governmentand net exports.
None of these exercises contributed significantly to explainingthe declining
volatility of output, and so they are not detailed anyfurther here.
Financial Panics and Nonetarist Explanations
Many economists have argued that a major causeof the United States's
superior macroeconomic performance sinceWorld War II has be the smoother
path followed by the money stock. According tothis line of thought, the
—12—Table 2
The Variance of Alternative Output Measures
a b c d e a a a a a
Period 1 Ly2 y3 y4 ____
1893—1915 .069 .076 .065 .070 .040
1893—1915/23—40 .081 .093 .078 .088 .055
1923—1940 .098 .115 .094 .110 .077
1947—1982 .027 .040 .027 .039 .018
Note: a. Standard deviation of the year—to—year change in the log of real GNP.
b. Standard deviation of the year—to—year change in the log of private
GNP. For the period before 1929 government transfers were assumed
to be equal to zero and data on government expenditures was taken
from Goldsmith (1955).
c. Standard deviation of the year—to—year change in the log of non—farm
GNP. For the period before 1929 the proportion of farm output in GNP
was assumed to be the same as the proportion of agricultural com-
modity production in total commodity production plus construction.
Figures on commodity production taken from Shaw (1947).
d. Standard deviation of the year—to—year change in the log of private
non—farm GNP. Constructed according to (b) and (c) on the assump-
tion that, before 1929, the government purchased no agricultural
products.
e. Standard deviation of the year—to—year change in the log of consump-
tion. Before 1929, "consumption" is defined according to Kuznets.
Thus it includes some government purchases, but fortunately these
are small in magnitude.
General data from the National Income and Product Accounts, from Kuznets
(1961), Shaw (1947), and Goldsmith (1955).
—13—Federal Reserve Board has done a good (albeit not perfect) job in the post-
War period. It has kept the money stock from exhibiting the substantial
year—to—year swings which characterized earlier periods.
The problem with this line of argument is that monetary aggregates
are in general endogenous variables. It is very hard to determine whether
movements in the money stock are causes or consequences of movements in
output. This is particularly true for the period of the gold standard,
during which the relation between the monetary base and the money stock was
very loose. Therefore, in order to examine monetaryliquidity approaches
to the business cycle, we concentrate our analysis on a class of events——
financial panics——that appear likely to be exogenous with respect to output,
and that are associated with substantial declines in the money stock. We
conclude below that, since financial panics cannot account for a significant
fraction of output variance before World War I, although they do account
for a significant part of the variance in the money stock, fluctuations
in monetary aggregates are perhaps best viewed as consequences of output
fluctuations. Arguments (like the one above) that regard the smoother growth
of aggregates as a cause of reduced variability rely on weak empirical support.
It is also important to study financial panics because a large
body of thought from Bagehot (1873) to Bernanke (1983) places stress on
the importance of a smoothly running financial system for good macro-
economic performance and on the serious real consequences of collapses
in the chain of financial intermediation.
This line of argument has typically run as follows: the financial
sector is unstable——subject to sudden sharp increases in the demand for
liquidity——in the absence of a lender of last resort. Financ, it is
—14—suggested, bears a strong analogy to musical chairs; the last one to the
bank during a panic walks away empty—handed. Therefore a financial system
that lacks a lender of last resort will be prone to a collapse, to a sudden
reduction in the amount of credit available and a sudden increase in the
price of whatever credit is available.
When it occurs, this financial collapse has serious realconse-
quences. The division of labor, the successful functioning of specialized
enterprises, depends upon the existence of a credit system:agents must be
able to quickly and cheaply acquire the resources to enable themto separate
the time of purchase from the time of sale. In the aftermath ofa panic
there is a lower degree of financial sophistication, thereare fewer possible
paths of intermediation. This is, in some sense, a reduction in the "natural"
level of output. With the financial system paralyzed asa result of the
preceding panic, production opportunities that would be profitable if there
were a high level of intermediation are not profitable at the lower level of
intermediation prevailing.
This point of view is supported by Sprague's narrative history of
merican financial crises (Sprague, 1910), where Sprague recounts, togive
just one example, how the unwillingness of banks to extend credit for
trans—Atlantic shipments during the panic of 1873 threatened the "cessation
of commodity exports," and how the news of this financialstringency in
New York "partially paralyzed" the movement ofcrops in the midwest (pp. 58—61).
This point of view is also supported by Bernanke (1983), whopoints out the
-strikingcorrelation between financial crises during the downward slide of
the Great Depression and reductions in output in excess of whatone would
have predicted from the behavior of the money stock alone.
—15—To test the adequacy of this hypothesis of the important role
played by financial panics we examine the effect of removing panic periods
on various measures of macro—economic stability. We focus on the period
from 1890—1913, before the founding of the Fed when panics should have had
their greatest impact. According to one formulation of the point of view,
periods immediately after financial panics have lower levels of "equilibrium"
output. Therefore, under this formulation, the variance of real GNP about
trend should be significantly lower if the immediate aftermath of panics
is excluded from analysis.
According to an alternative formulation, panics occur at the ends
of periods of "overtrading," of "speculation." Therefore the periods im-
mediately before panics are periods of abnormally high output, and the
aftermath of the panic——which sees the decline of output back to trend and
then below trend to its trough——is not necessarily characterized by an
excessively high variance of real GNP about trend. But in this case the
aftermath of panics should show an excessively large and negative average
value for the rate of change of real GNP: if the decline from overfull
output to some level of low—intermediation equilibrium is tobe ascribed
to the panic the decline must take place quickly, before the financial system
recovers its ability to provide credit. In the limit, if the economy
grew at a constant rate except for panic—induced declines, then excluding
panic periods would reduce the variance of the rate of growth to zero.
In practice, one would still expect the exclusion of the large negative
growth rates during panics to reduce the calculated variance of the
growth rate.
—16—We considered two possible ways to identify panics. First, there
is the list of major panics which Sprague considers important enough to
devote a chapter to in his book. In the period from 1890 to 1910, from
the beginning of the Gordon output series to the publication of Sprague's
book, Sprague finds incidents worth a chapter occurring in August, 1890,
MaythroughJuly, 1893, and October, 1907. An alternative, less judgmental
definition of a "panic"—--as a time in which either there is a (month—to—month)
lump of one percentage point in the coiiercial paper rate or in which banks
cease paying out deposits at par——produces twelve panics in the relevant
period: 1890:4, 1893:2, 1893:3, 1896:1, 1896:3, 1898:2, 1899:4, 1901:2,
1903:2, 1905:4, 1907:4, and 1909:4. Note that two of these less judgmentally
defined panics, 1893:2 and 1893:3, are really all part of one single distur-
bance according to Sprague.
Given these two lists of panics, we calculated variances for both
the logarithm of output and the quarterly rate of change of output for several
different sets of intervals. First for the entire 1890—1913 interval, then
for the interval with the panic quarters and with three quarters on each
side of them removed, for the interval with the panic quarter and one quarter
on each side removed, and lastly with the panic quarter and the two following
quarters removed. The results were as shown in Table 3.
Given the results of this simple exercise, it is hard to argue that
there is any way in which more than 20 percent of the standard deviation of
either output or its rate of change could be ascribed to the influence of
financial panics. Since nearly 40 percent of the variance in nominal mone-
tary grwoth is attributable to panic periods, this suggests tht financial


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 suspected. Note that this exercise places an upper bound on the influence
of financial panics: if whatever causes steep recessions also increases
the probability of financial panics the pattern shown in Table 3 could be
generated easily without any direct path of transmission from financial
panics to the macro—economy.
Are the numbers generated by the above exercise reasonable?
Is there any way to rationalize the apparent lack of strong links between
financial uproar and real recession? We believe that the conclusions of
the above exercise are reasonable, because the effects of financial panics
upon the rest of the real economy are smaller than is usually realized.
The 1907 Panic
We illustrate this by considering in some detail one typical panic.
Consider the panic of 1907, which occurred two quarters into a recession
that saw a year—over—year decline in output of approximately 6.4 percent.
This panic was marked by the typical features of Sprague's major panics:
nominal interest rates suddenly increase, banks outside of New York City
attempt to reduce their loan portfolios, everyone scrambles for liquidity,
banks refuse to pay out cash on demand at par to depositors, and "business
activity" slumps by 26 percent from the quarter before to two quarters
after the panic (see Sprague, 1910).
But what is most interesting is the small magnitude of the move-
ments in the variables that link the financial sector to real businesses.
Whenbanksrefuse to pay out cash for deposits at par, $1.00 in bank deposits
suddenly becomes a commodity with a cash price; in the panic of 1907, the
"price" of deposits followed the smooth path given in Table 4. Similarly,
with the breakdown of the regular system of intermediation, $l,OO0.00 in
deposits in New York suddenly became a commodity with a price in Philadelphia
or St. Louis.
—19—These deviations from par are all small, taking the values as of
10/26 (they are within the normal range) as a basis for comparison. Even at
the height of the crisis a bank in St. Louis could still obtain deposits in
New York by paying a premium of less than 1 percent. Similarly, the premium
required on cash to make depositors willing to keep their deposits in banks
never rose above three percent.
It is likely that these prices do not give a good idea of the
full extent of the panic. Agents may well have attempted to preserve the
good will of their traditional customers by continuing to trade with them
on "normal" terms of trade; "new" customers may have faced prices
significantly further from par than those given above. It is clear
that the deviations from par values of bank deposits could have had
a decisive effect on the profitability of any enterprise only if it were
leveraged to an extraordinary degree. If the quantity of credit were
rationed to familiar customers at "normal" prices, the panic could have
had significant real effects without these effects leaving their traces
in the numbers of Table 4.
But the quantity of credit outstanding was not significantly
reduced during the panic of 1907, at least according to Sprague. Between
August 22 and December 3, the volume of loans outstandingdecreased by
only two percent. Sprague concludes that for the crisisof 1907 at least
"it seems fair to assume that positive loan contraction was a comparatively
slight disturbing factor." The fall in output from August toDecember
was far greater, proportionately, than the declinein credit outstanding.
Moreover, the New York Clearing House banks, the linchpinsof the
financial system, increased their loans——from 712 to 775 million dollars.
A reduction in the quantity of credit available on account of the panic
—20—Table 4
Financial Disturbances Associated with the Panic of 1907
Note: a. Average weekly discount from par of bank
b. For bank—to—bank transactions.
From Sprague (1910) and Andrew (1908).
—21—
deposits priced in currency.
Average Discount on Depositsa
for that Week





10/28 0 $999.75 $999.75 $999.00
11/2 2.6 999.75 1,000.00 998.50
11/9 3.0 1,000.30 1,003.50 998.50
11/16 3.0 1,001.50 1,007.00 997.50
11/23 2.4 1,002.00 1,007.00 997.00
11/30 1.1 1,000.00 1,004.50 1,000.00
12/7 1.1 999.75 1,002.50 1,000.00
12/14 1.5 999.70 1,004.50 1,000.00could not have had severe repercussions on the level of real output.
How, in the face of the scramble for liquidity on the part of
depositors that was one of the major characteristics of the panic, did banks
manage to avoid a major contraction in the volume of loans? Two ways——the
first was the suspension of cash payments to depositors at par that has al-
ready been mentioned. The second way was by the creation of new reserves
by the banking system. On the assumption that privately—created reserves
functioned as the equal of high—powered money, private actions increased the
monetary base by 10 percent during the later months of the panic. Privately
created reserves were of limited acceptability, it is true, but within the
banking system the $238,000,000 of large—denomination certificates issued
by the New York Clearing House and backed by the long—run assets of the
Clearing House banks functioned perfectly well as high—powered money. And
these $238,000,000 of extra reserves were also augmented by $23,000,000 of
small clearing house certificates, by $12,000,000 of clearing house checks,
by $14,000,000 of cashiers' checks, and by $47,000,000 of manufactuers' pay
checks——all of which functioned in at least some spheres as substitutes
for currency (see Andrew (1908), reprinted in Sprague (1910)).
The small changes in the prices of financial resources during the
panic of 1907 and the quick action of private agents to take over the func-
tion of the nonexistent lender of last resort——the function of providing
additional reserves——seem to indicate that the merican national banking
system had developed a pattern of behavior by the panic of 1907which kept
financial stringency from having devastating effects on the realeconomy.--"
These considerations lead us to doubt that the reduced volatility
of output during the post—War period was primarily the resultôf the avoidance
7/Cagan (1965) also notes the existence of unauthorized money creation
during panics.
—22—of financial panics. We do not mean however to imply that panics never
had real effects. In particular, during the Great Depression when the
presence of the Fed discouraged banks from taking collective action to
avoid disastrous consequences, but the Fed itself was passive, financial
panics may well have played an important role. But the view that financial
panics were a principal cause of economic instability in the pre—World
War II period does not seem to be strongly supported. This finding weakens
the monetarist argument linking output variability to erratic monetary
growth, by showing that only relatively little of the variability in output
observed before World War II can be linked to exogenous changes in the
money stock. We return to the question of changing monetary policy in
Section IV.
The analysis so far suggests that it is unlikely that either
structural or monetary factors can account for the decline in the variability
of output since World War II. The one plausible lead that we have uncovered
is the increasing role of government. We investigate the role of stabili-
zation policy in the next section.
—23—II.THE EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION POLICIES
A major difference between the pre— and post—World War II periods
was the government's acceptance after World War II of an obligation to
stabilize the economy. This obligation was recognized by statute in the
Employment Act of 1946 and pragmatically in the speeches and actions of
various high officials. It is natural to conjecture that this change in
attitudes and policies contributed to the decline in the volatility of output
observed in the post—World War II period. It is also frequently argued that
automatic stabilization in the form of a progressive tax system and counter—
cyclical expenditure measures such as unemployment insurance have contributed
to enhanced economic stability by reducing the multiplier. Econometric ex-
ercises support this hypothesis: Hickman and Coents (1976) estimates of the
real autonomous expenditures impact multiplier drop from 3.23 in the inter—War
period to 1.88 in the post—War period. This section examines the contribution
of both automatic fiscal stabilizers, and discretionary policies in explain-
ing the post—War improvement in economic performance.
Automatic Stabilizers
The traditional argument that automatic stabilization has improved
macro—economic performance emphasizes the role of taxes and transfers in
mitigating the effects of changes in GNP on disposableincome.'
This account is less satisfactory than it appears at first. Modern
theories of the consumption function presume the ability on the part of
consumers to smooth out fluctuations in disposable income by borrowing
-andlending. If consumers, in fact, possess this ability, it is notclear
why the government's smoothing the path of disposable income through
fiscal actions should have real effects. Automatic stabilization policies
8/See for example the treatment in Burns (1960), Gordon (1984), or Baily
(1978).
—24—will have important real effects only if a sizeable fraction of consumption
represents purchases by liquidity constrained consumers. Thus establishing
the existence of liquidity constrained consumers is necessary to a
demonstration of the efficacy of automatic stabilization policy. But
this discussion raises another possibility. Perhaps the multiplier has
changed over time because the fraction of liquidity constrained consumers
has declined due to growth in the availability of consumer credit.
This subsection explores these issues. We begin by documenting
.-..1 (1'tD A4 .l-sl. — '...ssL.Ls5.aLs51 L La L. S'.J&LO IJL.LWC.L.sL'asflas..... Ls .s.ojJ,Jo CJ SC SLLL. JULC .L S CCL- L.a U. ..L'..JLSO
overtime, and then we turn to an examination of the importance of
liquidity constraints.
We have already emphasized the importance of the increasing size
of government. The extent to which this growth has changed the nexus between
CNP and disposable income can be seen in Table 5 which reports the results of
regressions of disposable income on GNP for various sub—periods of the 1898—
1982 interval. We use slightly different subperiods here than in the pre-
ceding sections because data on disposable income do not go all the way back
to 1890. The results indicate a dramatic change in the relationship between
the pre— and post—War periods. During the 1949—1982 interval a marginal
dollar of GNP raised disposable income by $.39 compared to $.82 during the
pre—War period. There is no strong evidence of any change between the pre—
World War I and the interwar period in the share of GNP changes which fall
on disposable income.
The changing relationship between GNP and disposable income is
well illustrated by the two recent serious U.S. recessions. During the
—25—Table 5
Response of Disposable Income
to a Change in Total Income
Period Coefficient of y D.W.
1898-1916 .76 .54 0.97
(.16)
1923—1940 .95 .61 1.70
(.24)
1949—1982 .39 .59 2.07
(n\
• '-"I
Note: Equation estimated in real magnitudes,
=
c0+ a(y) + e,
E(c2) proportional to Y2.
Annual data taken from Kuznets (1961), Goldsmith (1955), and the
N.I.P.A. Before 1929, "disposable income" is approximated by
nominal income minus the sum of federal, state, and local government
revenues, and minus corporate gross internal saving.
—26—1981—82 recession when GNP fell by 1.8 percent disposable income actually
rose by 1.0 percent. During the 1973—1975 precession when output fell
by a comparable amount, disposable income rose by 1.1 percent.
Fiscal policies are not the only determinant of the linkage
between GNP and disposable income. Other considerations including the
cyclical effects on the distribution of factor incomes, and corporate
payout policies also impinge on the relationship. We briefly examined
these issues but were able to find little evidence suggesting that changes
in these other factors have worked to stabilize disposable income in the
post—War period. We thus credit fiscal policies with almost all the changes
shown in Table 5. This conclusion runs somewhat counter to Burns' (1960)
somewhat impressionistic discussion but we do not pursue the issue here.
The foregoing discussion is relevant to the behavior of real
economic activity only if liquidity constraints are an important factor
in the determination of aggregate consumption. To identify the extent of
liquidity constraints we model aggregate consumption as a combination of
the consumption of unconstrained consumers whose consumption evolves
according to a random walk as specified in Hall (1978), and liquidity
constrained consumers whose consumption is assumed to be a constant
fraction of disposable income.
For convenience we work with the data in logarithmicform.2" Wepos-
tulate that consumption on non—durable goods and services evolves according to:
(8) Ct =Ct'+ Tn(YD)
where Cr" represents unconstrained consumption and m indicates approximately
the fraction of disposable income spent by liquidity constrained consumers.
9/We also worked with the model in level form, but we found that the
overidentifying restrictions present in the model presented below were
more frequently rejected.
—27—The polar case where in=O gives rise to the pure permanent income hypothesis.
When m=l consumption just depends on current disposable income.
The argument of Hall (1978) implies, assuming that the real rate
of return can be approximated as a constant, that
(9)C
=b1C1+
where is uncorrelated with any information available at time t—l.
In order to estimate m we proceed as follows. First we assume
that YD evolves according to a second order autoregression process.
That is
(10) YD =
p0+ PiYD1+ 2't—2 + + U
Combining (8) and (9) and (10) we obtain the estimable equation:
(11) Ct =b0+ biCi + m[0+ (p1 —bi)YD1+
p2YD 2 + P3(t)]
wheree is a residual that is uncorrelated with thevariables on the right
hand side of (11). Now (10) and (11) can be estimated jointly to yield
estimates of m. The overidentifying restrictions implied by the model
can be tested by estimating (10) and (11) in unconstrained fashion.
Estimates of both restricted and unrestricted forms of the system
(10) and (11) using annual data on the consumption of non—durables and
services are presented in Table 6 for various intervals. The results
for the pre—War periods are quite striking. For the interval 1899—1916
the data support the hypothesis that essentially all consumption was done
by liquidity constrained consumers. Moreover, the overidentifying restric-
tions implied by the model are accepted comfortably. The results for the
entire pre—War period are also supportive of this conclusion though they
are less satisfactory. In the constrained equation case theoint estimate
of m is 1.4 which is implausibly large. The overidentifying restrictions
—28—Table 6
Estimates of the Extent of Liquidity Constraints
Y Y C Period Restricted —l —2 t —l t m log L
1949—1982 No 1.02—.30 .012 .73 .014 .28 192.32
(.19) (.18) (.077)(.13) (005) (.31)
1949—1982 Yes .77 .06 .0561.00 .50 189.89
(.15) (.14) (.14) (.02) (.46)
1899—1916 No .35—.05 .02 —.1 .01 1.1 70.28
(.22) (.23) (.01) (.3) (.01) (1.2)
1899—1916 Yes .33 .20 .014—.1 1.1 69.35
(.17) (.12) (.005) (.2) (.1)
1899—1916 No 1.17—.35 .003 .43 .013 .54 99.14
1922—1940 (.16) (.15) (002)(.14) (.004) (.41)
1899—1916 Yes 1.07—.31 .005 .62 —— 1.4 97.63
1922—1940 (.12) (.10) (.002) (.09) (.2)
Note: The left hand side reports estimates of (10) while estimates of (11)
are on the right hand side. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors..
—29—are also less well satisfied. These less satisfactory results probably
occur because our autoregression is not a satisfactory predictor of future
income during the Depression. When (in results not shown) the Depression
years are dropped from the sample but the 1920s are included, the results
look very much like those for the 1899—1916 interval.
Unfortunately, the extent of liquidity constraints in the post-
War process is difficult to gauge because disposable income was not far
from following a random walk. However, the point estimates of both the
constrained and unconstrained versions of the model suggest that some but
not all consumers were liquidity constrained. Unfortunately, the data have
the power to reject neither of the interesting polar hypotheses. Hence
nothing definitive can besaid)'
Taken together these estimates confirm that liquidity constraints
matter for aggregate consumption, as already asserted by Flavin (1981).
This suggests a role for automatic stabilizers in explaining why output
was less volatile in the post—War period. They also indicatehowever
that progress in financial intermediation may have contributed to stability
by enhancing the consumer's ability to smooth fluctuationsin income by
borrowing. Certainly households have had much easier access to liquidity
in the post—War than in the pre—War period. The most strikingrise is
in the volume of consumer credit outstanding: from $6 billionin 1945
or 5 percent of consumption to $380 billion or 23 percentof consumption
in 1982. The growth of nonf arm mortgage debt has also beenremarkable:
from $27 billion or 54 percent of consumption in 1934 to $1,548billion or
82 percent of consumption in 1982. By and large, beforeWorld War II American
households had (except for some mortgages and loans intendedtosupport
10/We also examined quarterly data for this interval, butdid not find
that they shed much light, so no results are reportedhere.
—30—the leveraged purchase of securities) little access to credit markets. Ac-
cording to Robert A. Gordon's paper in Anderson (1951), the post—World War I
construction boom was primarily an apartment —nota single family house —boom.
Since World War II households have had a great deal of access. It would be
surprising If this structural shift had had no macro—economic effects.
Discretionary Stabilization Policy
The most direct way of examining the efficacy of discretionary stabi—
lization policies would be to examine whether or not discretionary policy was
counter—cyclical in the post—War period, and to estimate its effects. This
is much easier said than done. Distinguishing the discretionary from the auto-
matic component of policy is difficult to do. Moreover, given uncertainties
about lags, gauging the effects of policies is also problematic. Exercises
such as the one performed by Eckstein and Sinai in this volume tend to suggest
that monetary policy caused at least as many recessions as it prevented, and
do not find much evidence for the success of discretionary fiscal policies.
We do not attempt such an exercise here. Rather we turn to a less direct
test of the possible efficacy of discretionary stabilization policies.
The essential idea of our test is as follows. The variance in real
GNP depends on both the size of initial shocks to it, and the extent to which
they persist. Discretionary stabilization policies presumably work by re-
ducing the persistence of shocks to GNP, not by limiting the size of initial
shocks. Thus if discretionary stabilization policies became more efficacious
in the post—War period one would expect to see a decline in the persistence
of output shocks during this interval.
Table 7 presents estimated impulse response functions for GNP for
various intervals. The variance of shocks is also presented. All cal-
culations are based on autoregressions of annual GNPdata.T The
11/The data are taken from Friedman and Schwartz (1983), who try to construct
consistent annual time series back to 1865.
—31—Table 7
Persistence of Output Shocks
Period 0 1 2 3 4 Standard Deviation of Shocks
1893—1915
AR(l) 1.00 .39 .15 .06 .03 .062
(.19) (.14)(.09)(.06
AR(2) 1.00 .42 .11 .02 .00 .063
(.22)(.18) (.11)(.09)
AR(3) 1.00 .42 .08 .08 .06 .064
(.23)(.19) (.18) (.19)
1923—1940
AR(1) 1.00 .87 .76 .66 .57 .095
(.12)(.21) (.28) (.32)
AR(2) 1.001.33 1.25 .97 .64 .083
(.21) (.25)(.24) (.25)
AR(3)1.001.37 1.26 .95 .62 .086
(.26) (.29)(.30) (.28)
1949—1982
AR(1) 1.00 .70 .49 .35 .22 .026
(.15)(.21) (.22) (.21)
AR(2) 1.00 .81 .47 .22 .09 .026
(.19)(.23) (.32) (.27)
AR(3)1.00 .82 .46 .24 .12 .027
(.20)(.27) (.35) (.33)
Note: Annual GNP data from Friedman & Schwartz (1983). Standard errors——
generated by stochastic simulation——in parentheses.
—32—calculations reveal that if anything the persistence of output fluctuations
increased between the pre—World War I and post—World War II periods.
Conconimitantly, the decline in the variance of output shocks between the
two intervals exceeds the decline in the variance of real GNP. Thus the
data provide little support for discretionary stabilization policy argument.
A more subtle form of the discretionary policy argument, noted
in Baily (1978), runs as follows. Whether or not stabilization policy is
actually efficacious, it is perceived as effective. Because recessions are
expected to be short, consumers and investors do not cut back on spending
plans as much as they otherwise would. The prophecy is therefore self—
fulfilling and the economy is more stable. This argument is also put
forth to explain greater wage and price rigidity in the post—War period.
It is suggested that because the economy is expected to return to equilib-
rium more quickly workers and producers feel less pressure to cut wages
and prices in the face of shortfalls in demand. This argument like the
more direct one predicts that serial correlation in output should have
declined in the post—War period. As just noted, this prediction is refuted
by the data.
The pattern followed by stock market prices provides a further
way to test arguments about confidence in the face of economic downturns
if one is willing to accept the following two assumptions: first, that
the expectations implicit in the stock market's guesses about the discounted
value of the future profitability of American enterprise are the same
as the expectations of those who decide on investment. We recognize
the weakness of this support of our argument, but we see no way to avoid
making it that will allow us to use the information found in the pattern
—33—of stock prices. Second, that the relation between the profitability
of those companies counted in stock market averages and the macro—economic
performance of the economy has remained constant. As a test of this
second assumption, we examined the cyclical variability of dividends
paid by companies listed in the Standard and Poor's 500 index; we cannot
find any significant changes in the cyclical flexibility of dividends,
and so we are led to tentatively accept this second assumption.
The stock market is a leading indicator. It typically reaches
its real peak several quarters before output. The agents whose expectations
set prices in the stock market know that a recession is coming. The
magnitude of the decline in profitability that they expect can be seen
in the magnitude of the decline in the stock market. And so the elasticity
of the level of the stock market with respect to future values of the GNP
gap is a measure of the "sanguinity" of stock market investors,is a
measure of the subjective probability assigned to the possibility that
the recession may be the beginning of a deep, long period of subnormal
output rather than a short, shallow correction to the economy.
Accordingly, we regressed the log of the real value of two stock
market indices (the Dow—Jones industrial and Standard and Poor's composite)
on a quadratic in time and on five, six, and nine leads (for quarterlydata)
of the difference between the log of GNP and the log of natural GNP.
We also corrected for (substantial) serial correlation. Because the
behavior of the two indices was nearly identical, only the S&P results
are reported here. The parameter of interest is E B.
Interpretations of these results, which are displayed in Table 8,






Period (Sum of Leads) rhoR i rho R ____rho R
1893—1915 1.75 .73 .975 2.12 .73.975 2.20 .76 .977
(.50) (.08) (.57) (.08) (.79) (.08)
1922—1940 1.81 .82 .905 1.69 .81.905 1.56 .75 .912
(.59) (.07) (.61) (.07) (.56) (.08)
1947—1970 3.51 .95 .945 2.33 .94.953 1.05 .93 .965
(.92) (.03) (.99) (.03) (1.07) (.04)
1947—1980 2.90 .93 .929 2.32 .92.934 1.13 .90 .944
(.83) (.03) (.90) (.03) (1.06) (.04)
1970—1980 3.52 .78.987 3.59 .78.987 3.17 .78 .987
(1.47) (.10) (1.57) (.10) (1.98) (.11)
Estimation procedure described in text.
—35—in the residuals tells us that whatever is moving stock prices (1) does
not follow a simple trend, and (2) dominates those movements induced by
the near—term (within two years) cyclical outlook. There is also an
errors—in—variables problem here: the value of the independent GNP gap
used is the ex—post realized value, rather than the ex—ante expected value.
To the degree that agents do not correctly forecast the near—term cyclical
outlook, the estimates of the sum of the lag coefficients are not consistent.
Nevertheless, simple inspection of the various sums of the lead
coefficients does not lend support to the hypothesis of the increasing
"sanguinity" of investors. A given cyclical movement in the GNP gap over
the two years to come seems to be preceded by a relative decline in the
stock market that is, if anything, larger since World War II than it was
before. A given expected decline in real GNP relative to trend seems
to be associated with a slightly greater decline in the discounted value
of future profits——as measured by the stock market——than before World War II.
This simple exercise seems to indicate that those investing in the stock
market do not expect the same initial decline in GNP to be recouped more
quickly——due to government stabilization policies——after World War II
than before World War II.
The analysis in this section suggests that automatic stabilizers
have contributed to the reduction in the variance of GNP that has been
observed since World War II. There is little evidence that discretionary
policies have played an important role. Indeed, the persistenceof output
shocks has actually increased. But it seems unlikely that automaticstabili-
zation can account for the whole of the decline in the variance of output.
The declines in the volatility of investment that have been observedsince
—36—the War exceed the declines in the volatility of consumption. Moreover,
quantitative estimates of the change in the Keynesian multiplier such as
those provided by Hickman and Coen (1976), are not large enough to account
for a three fold decline in the variance of output shocks reported in Table 7.
We therefore turn in the next section to an examination of other structural
changes which maycontributeto explaining the declining variance of output.
—37—III.PRICE AND OUTPUT FLEXIBILITY
Some common contemporary explanations of business cycles focus on
the role of institutional factors which lead to deviations from the atom—
istic competitive model of classical economic theory. For example, long
term nominal labor contracts are sometimes invoked to explainhow nominal
shocks can have real effects on economic activity. Alternatively, long
term attachments between workers and firms combined with asymmetricalinf or—
mation——in a phrase, implicit contracts——are sometimes invoked toaccount for
involuntary unemployment and cyclical fluctuations.
The evidence presented in that section suggests that this focus
may well be misplaced. We show in thefirst part of this section that, in
a variety of ways, the American economy has becomemuch less "Wairasian"
over the same century that has also seen a pronouncedtrend toward greater
macro—economic stability. This suggests that the sources ofeconomic
instability do not lie in the non—Walrasian characterof certain economic
institutions)1 We then demonstrate that plausible macro—economic models
imply that increased price rigidity will increaserather than reduce
macro—economic stability. Finally, we suggest that priceflexibility
by raising real interest rates may haveexacerbated the 1929—1933 economic
downturn.
The extent to which the economy was "Wairasian" inthe past is
obviously impossible to gauge precisely. Market powerdepends not only
on the extent of concentration in productand labor markets, but also on
12/Of course it is possible that, as argued byJohn Taylor in his paper in
this volume, increasing price rigidity didexacerbate cycljcal fluctuations,
but this influence was more than offset by otherfactors. We return to
Taylor's analysis in section IV.
—38-factors such as costs of search and the extent of information asymmetries.
All these factors share the characteristic of being very hard to quantify.
However, the available evidence suggests that the American economy was
significantly more competitive prior to World War II than it has been since
the war.
One indicator is the increased role of government after World War II.
The share of GNP passing through the public sector rose from approximately
4 percent around 1900 to approximately 10 percent in 1929—1937 and to about
16 percent by 1970. Of potentially greater importance is the greatly increased
scope of government regulation: by the estimates of Nutter and Einhorn
(1969), close to 22 percent of GNP produced in 1958 was produced in sectors
of the economy in which government was a predominant presence. And this
estimate predates the rise in the l960s and l970s of what is termed the
"regulatory state.
A similar conclusion is suggested by the available data on industri-
al concentration. The percent of national income originating in proprietor-
ships dropped from 28 percent in 1929 to 18 percent in 1969. In 1918,
35 percent of total manufacturing assets were held by the nation's 100 largest
manufacturing corporations. Their share had reached 49 percent by 1970.
Perhaps the most dramatic changes have occurred in the character of
the labor market. Some information on the changing character of labor markets
is presented in Table 9. A clear pattern emerges. Long term contracts were
essentially nonexistent prior to the passage of the Wagner Act. A small pro-
portion of workers were in unions, and the prevailing political climate
offered unions few of the sources of institutionalized strength that legal

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 workers was only 9 percent in 1930 compared to 29 percent in 1950. Likewise
the fraction of workers in institutionalized settings has increased
dramatically. The fraction working on farms has fallen from 38 percent in
1900 to 3 percent in 1970, and, in 1900, close to half of all farmers were
owner—operators. And the fraction of workers in white—collar jobs has
increased from 17 percent in 1900 to 48 percent in 1970. This is an interest-
ing statistic in light of the fact that a substantial proportion of white—
collar workers are engaged in what one might call non—market—oriented coor-
dination of production.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the changing character of labor
markets comes from information on separations. Ross (1958) examines the
argument that a new industrial feudalism developed in the U.S. following
World War II. As Table 10 indicates, the quit rate in manufacturing (the
only sector on which data is available) declines from over 6 percent before
World War I to close to 2 percent recently. The total separation rate
declined by about 42 percent between 1920—23 and 1973—79, implying an equal
percentage increase in average manufacturing job tenure. Even though most
turnover involves the young, these data still are indicative of a substan-
tial increase over time in the importance of something that might be called
job—specific human capital, and therefore in implicit long term labor
contracts.
Quantifying the extent of deviations from the Wairasian ideal due
to more subtle factors such as increased labor market specialization,
and increased product differentiation is obviously not possible. However
a number of factors suggest those factors have increased in importance.
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Source: Historical Statistics and Ross (1958).
—42—than the GNP suggesting a greater role in firms facing downward sloping
product demand areas. The educational level of the work force has expanded
greatly, as has the number of different occupations. To gauge the extent
of imperfections in today's economy, one need only ask how many firms are
indifferent to selling more output at prevailing prices? Or, how many workers
are indifferent to losing their jobs.
It seems very likely that increased economic stability has been a
iwIiir'1-rf fh.Q4 (lU'(l TtQ -PDr'mii,t tfP1 TfQ k'ttTgSfl T.7(VkPrQ
andfirms, for example, slow the response of employment to fluctuations
in demand. This in turn reduces the extent to which demand shocks are
propagated by increasing the stability of disposable income. More formally,
it is possible to demonstrate in a variety of implicit contracting models
that because of workers' desire for insurance, employment is more stable
than it would be if a Wairasian equilibrium were attained every period.
Likewise, increasing conglomeration of firms, and the resulting increased
reliance on internal finance reduces the liquidity effects of economic
downturns. It is also natural to conjecture that regulatory policies
are likely to keep the output of regulated firms at relatively stable levels.
It is unquestionably the case that price volatility in the American
economy declined in conjunction with the changes discussed above. The
standard deviation of annual rates of inflation from trend was 1.5 percent
for 1949—1982, compared with 2.4 percent for 1893—1915 and 4.8 percent
for 1923—1940. It is less clear whether wages and prices have become
more flexible in response to output shocks of a given size. Cagan (1975)
and Sachs (1980) report that wholesale prices have been less sensitive
to movements in aggregate demand during the postwar period. However,
—43—Schultze (1980) argues that there was little change in the sensitivity of
prices —measuredby the non—farm GNP deflator —betweenthe pre— and post-
War periods. Gordon (1980) finds that the initial response of prices to
nominal demand has not changed, but notes the increasing persistence of
inflation in the post—War period)-"
It is not easy to make a coherent interpretation of these findings.
We suspect that there has been a small decline in short—run price flexibility
(a decline in the slope of the short—run aggregate supply curve), but that
this decline has been so small that it is not apparent in the less sensitive
GNP deflator and can be seen only in measures of producer prices. We do
conclude that there has been an increase in the persistence of price
movements. Below, we present a simple model to analyze the effect of an
increase in such persistence on macro—economic performance. Before examining
this issue, it is important to emphasize that the evidence presented in
the preceding section suggests that greater price rigidity in the post—War
period cannot be attributed to greater certainty that downturns would be
temporary. This possibility is refuted by the evidence suggesting that
output shocks have become more not less persistent and that the sensitivity
of the stock market to output shocks has if anything declined.
Is Price Flexibility Destabilizing?
In the remainder of this section, we entertain the hypothesis
that greater price flexibility in the pre—World War II period was a cause
of greater instability in output. This is, of course, the exact opposite
of the canonical Keynesian nominal—rigidities point of view which leads,
in John Taylor's words, to the assertion that "less flexible wages and
prices should lead to a deterioration of macroeconomic performance."
13/AndSchultzealso finds increasing persistence after 1967, which he
interprets as a shift in the inflation norm.
—44—But John Maynard Keynes disagreed, and in Keynes (1936) argued against
this very proposition, claiming instead that:
it would be much better that wages should be rigidly
fixed and deemed incapable of material changes, than
that depression should be accompanied by a gradual
downward tendency of money—wages, a further moderate
wage reduction being expected to signalize each increase
of, say, one percent in the amount of unemployment.
For example, the effect of an expectation that wages
are going to sag by, say, two percent in the coming year
will be roughly equivalent to the effect of a rise of
two percent in the amount of interest payable for the
same period. (quoted in Tobin (1975))
Keynes seeks to argue that the simple solution to involuntary unemployment —
loweringthe nominal wage —willnot work. For the economy is not a static
object converging to a stationary equilibrium. The lowering of wages (and
prices) required to get the quantity of real balances up to its full—em-
ployment equilibrium value itself creates an additional intertemporal
disequilibrium. For changes in the aggregate price level disturb what is
perhaps the single most important price in the whole economy, the real
interest rate.
This point of view deserves a more formal examination, which we
provide within the framework of a simple macro—economic model. The
model highlights the fact that it is the ex—ante real —notthe nominal —
interestrate that should enter into the determination of investment.
It also provides for a distinction between price flexibility and price
persistence stressed by Gordon (1980).
We treat all variables (except interest and inflation rates)
as log deviations from trends. Solving out an IS—LM system, where the
—45—nominal interest rate enters the LM equation and the real interest rate
enters the IS equation, yields an aggregate demand curve of the form:
(12) =1(m +2(Ep+1 — +
Ct
We model expectations by assuming perfect foresight on the part of investors:
(13) Etpt÷l =t+l
The aggregate supply side of the model is somewhat more complex.
An easy way to model the independent dimensions of short—run price flexibility
and of price persistence is to adopt a multiperiod nominal contract framework.
Workers are divided into n+l equal groups. Group j negotiates an n+l
period contract, with a fixed nominal wage, in all periods for which







In the contract period, group j's nominal wage is renegotiated for the next
n+l periods. The wage rise won by group j in these negotiations is the
average of the wage rise won by the other n groups in their negotiations
plus or minus a term (czq) which is supposed to capture the effect of labor
market tightness. In their negotiations, workers are backward—looking.
Since we are working within the Keynesian tradition, we do not think that
this is an important defect in the mode1)' Moreover, any attempt to model
the wage determination process fully within an optimizing framework would
be hopelessly complex.
14/In subsequent work, we hope to examine the issues here within a model
like that of Taylor (1979) where contracts are partly forward and partly
backward looking. It seems unlikely that this will alter qualitative
conclusions.
—46—To close the model, the price level is taken to be a simple average
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Inthis framework, increases in the contract period —n+l—canbe inter-
preted as increases in price persistence. Increases in the labor—market
conditions coefficient —increasesin c —canbe interpreted as increases
in short—run aggregate price flexibility. Because the model is designed
to highlight the effects of inflation on output, it has no role for
discretionary fiscal policy and no source of shocks other than ,the
shock to aggregate demand. We take monetary policy to be completely non—
accomodative: m is equal to its trend value (zero) always. This rules out
the possibility that the driving force behind economic instabflity is inap-
propriate government policy (a bad monetary reaction function) rather than
—47—the internal dynamics of the model itself. We wish to use this model to show
only that the conventional wisdom holding that an increase in nominal rigidi-
ties (either in the form of a smaller response of wages to labor market
conditions or in the form of a longer contract period —more"persistence)
is harmful to macro—economic stability, rests on shaky theoretical foundations.
We assume a white—noise, unit variance generating process for the
demand shock ,andsimulate the model for various parameter values. Recall
hih v1iienf Ri1iecthateither the dirp-t("1-irniiMt-v"eFfe-i- —0
ofa decline in real balances is large or that the effect of a decline in
real balances on the interest rate is large, that is, that the elasticity of
money demand with respect to the interest rate is small. A high value for
implies that the expected inflation effects on aggregate demand are large,
due either to real interest effects or redistributions between debtors and
creditors. The parameter estimates are chosen to be reasonable. For example,
= 1.0,and =1.6,the standard IS—LM Keynesian multiplier is l.5)-"
Experimentation with parameter values outside the range displayed frequently
resulted in instability but did not alter the qualitative conclusions.
Three conclusions emerge from Table 11 where the variance of
output is calculated for various parameter values. First, in many cases
the economy is unstable under the assumption that monetary policy is non—
accomodative with respect to output shocks. This result parallels that
of Tobin (1975). Second, in the cases where stability is attained,
the variance of output decreases with increases in the contract length)"
When the length of the period over which wages remain fixed increases,
15/Assuming that the constant—interest—rate multiplier is 3.0.
16/Except for cases in which a high adjustment parameter com'bined with a































*Model unstable for these parameter values.
—49—
Table 11



















*** 2.4*the volatility of output declines. This result implies that increasing
wage flexibility by reducing the length of the contract period might well
worsen macro—economic performance. This inference is strengthened by
noting that increasing the length of the contract period increases the
likelihood that the economy will be stable at all. Third, increases in
the sensitivity of current wages to output have an ambiguous effect on
the volatility of output.
These results are entirely attributable to the fact that the real
interest rate —andso Ep —entersinto the determination of aggregate L11
demand.
The model considered here is obviously highly stylized. No role
is allowed for lagged responses of output or money demand to changes in
real interest rates. Deflation has no direct effect on aggregate demand,
operating only through its impact on real interest rates. Thus, the
distributional effects emphasized by Tobin (1975) are suppressed entirely.
Perhaps most importantly, we assume no response of monetary or fiscal
policy variables to demand shocks. This exercise hardly proves that
price flexibility increased the volatility of economic activity prior
to World War II. But it does strongly suggest that deviations of the real
interest rates from its general equilibrium value caused by the process
of equilibration in product and labor markets, may contribute as much
or more to economic instability as deviations in product prices or wages
from their static equilibrium values.
It might be objected that our analysis here misses the point since
we assume an aggregate supply mechanism which implies that a change in
the monetary rule could have a long run effect on output. Sucti an objection
—50—is made by McCallum (1983) to analyses similar to the one presented here.
This objection is miplaced. At one level, the criticism is irrelevant
since we do not use our model to consider alternative monetary rules.
At a more fundamental level, it ignores the need for economic theory to
provide a theory of how prices move to clear markets. As Fisher (1983)
and others have eloquently argued it is insufficient to assert that
economies will always reach their Wairasian equilibria, without describing
how they get there. Some sort of price—adjustment equation like (18) is
an indispensible part of any fully articulated economic model.
A macroeconomic view that places stress on the dangerous potential
for destabilizing deflation present under a regime of flexible prices can
avoid some of the problems that economists have traditionally encountered
while trying to analyze the origins of the Great Depression in the U.S.
Economists like Temin (1974), who attempt to account for the Great Depression
by a decline in exogenous spending induced by falling "animal spirits," have
a difficult time explaining why those who make investment decisions sudden-
ly become more pessimistic. Without making reference to the destabilizing
effects of deflation, it is also difficult to account for rising real
interest rates in the face of an autonomous decline in spending.
Economists like Friedman and Schwartz (1963), who attempt to ac-
count for the Great Depression in terms of an inappropriately contractionary
monetary policy, have a difficult time accounting for the behavior of the
real money supply. As Figure 3 shows, the real money supply actually
increased slightly between 1929 and 1933 while output was falling by close
to 50 percent. Since aggregate demand should be closely linked to the
real money supply, it is hard to see how a monetary impulse could have
—51—Figure 3
Percent Deviation of the Real Money Supply





























—53—a monetary impulse could have caused the Depression without ever reducing
real money balances. Moreover, without making reference to the effects
of deflation, it is hard to explain why nominal interest rates fell in
the face of a monetary shock.
More generally evidence for the view that increased price flexi-
bility is destabilizing comes from an examination of the changing behavior
of real interest rates plotted in Figure 4. The standard deviation of ex—post
real rates on an annual basis was 3.10 percent in the 1893—1915 interval, com-
pared to .57 percent in the 1949—1970 interval and 1.37 percent in the
1971—1982 interval.-' Before 1979, the highest real interest rate observed
on a quarterly basis was 6 percent in 1974, and in only five quarters in
the pre—1979 post—World War II period were real rates greater than 4 per-
cent observed. On the other hand, real rates greater than 6 percent
occurred in every single reference—cycle recession (except 1903—04) during
the pre—Worid War I period. It seems clear that these variations in real
rates should have contributed greatly to economic instability.
17/The behavior of real rats since 1979 is, in the context of the rest of
the post—World War II period, anomalous. A glance at recent real rates
seems to suggest that Mierican economic policymakers are attempting to
restore the pattern of real rates characteristic of the l890s.
—54—IV. IS AGGREGATE PRICE FLEXIBILITY DISTABILIZING?
In section III we argued that in the standard aggregate demand—
aggregate supply framework there are no strong theoretical reasons for
believing that a small increase in aggregate price flexibility —defined
either as an increase in the responsiveness of wages to labor market
conditions or as a decrease in tpersistencett —wouldreduce the variance
of output. We also expressed our suspicion that, in the United States,
the relationship between price and output flexibility goes the otherway
from that typically assumed. We suggested that some of the relative
macro—economic good fortune of the United States since World War II can
be traced to the possibility that a flatter short run aggregate supply
curve dampens fluctuations in the real interest rate and so dampens
fluctuations in output.
We put forth this potential explanation because the other mech-
anisms that we have identified cannot account for all of the decline in
the variability of output from the pre— to the post—War period. The
rising share of government expenditures can account for a small fraction
of the decline in variance, and the smoothing of purchases of consumer
non—durables and services as a result of automatic stabilizers and commer-
cial credit can account for a significant portion. But there remains a
substantial decline in the relative variance of "long—term" expenditures —
construction,business investment, and consumer durable purchases —thatis
documented in Robert Gordon and John Veitch's paper in this volume. The
standard explanation is that this decline in the variability of "long—term"
expenditures is due to the expectation of successful stabi1iztion policy.
But, since we cannot find the traces in other economic variables that we
—55—expected to find if this were indeed the correct explanation, we believe
that the decline in the variance of "long—term" expenditures needs further
explanation. And since "long—term" expenditures are, in theory, very
much dependent on the real interest rate, we advance the hypothesis that
the primary channel through which price flexibility affects macro—economic
performance is through the instability induced by aggregate price flexibility
in the real interest rate.
John Taylor's Analysis
John Taylor in his contribution to this volume reaches exactly
the opposite conclusion, finding that improved macro—economic performance
has taken place in spite of rather than because of the increased rigidity
of wages and prices in the post—war period. Our explanation has the virtue
of parsimony. We attribute the major change in economic performance to the
major change in economic structure rather than telling a complex story
involving offsetting effects. Moreover Taylor provides no explanation of
the forces that have accounted for the huge decline in the variance of ag-
gregate demand shocks which he claims took place. As we shall argue below
Taylor's theory that monetary policy has become less accomodative over
time also seems implausible. Taylor rests his conclusions on bivariate
time series analysis of prices and output. We begin by showing that his
conclusions can be reproduced in a model where increased price flexibility
increases macro—economic instability and then turn to other aspects of
his argument.








and assume perfect foresight for investors:
(23) EP+i =
(1)contains in order to make the timing come out right:
firms placing orders for investment goods this period, orders
not show up in output until next period.






The inflation rate accelerates or declerates depending on the output gap.
This aggregate supply equation is the simplest that is both "superneutral"
and exhibits "persistence."
In order to close the model, a money supply rule is needed.
The simple assumption of section II, the assumption of no movement in the
money stock at all, will not be a satisfactory underpinning for empirical
analysis. We assume:
(24) m =(l.X)p+ Xp1
The money stock accomodates to the price level partially within the period
and fully after two periods. A value of one for X would imply no accomo—
dation within the period; a value of zero would imply complete accomodation
within the period.










If follows a white—noise process with unit variance, then
solving for the inverse of the variance of output leads to the equation:
(29) 2+ +
(2 + l2X)2
Therefore further increases in the price flexibility parameter a are de-
stabilizing, increase the variance of output, so long as
(30) a< +1x 22l
But (27) and (28) imply that a must satisfy (30). In this model, the vari-
ance of output is least when a equals zero, when there is no flexibility
at all in the aggregate price level.
Arid yet empirical analysis of a system generated by (1) through (4)
would produce results that might mimic quite closely those obtained by
Taylor for the post—War period. If the economist knew the timing of the
aggregate supply equation she might be able to recover it exactly:
31) =—i+
Andif she attempted to estimate a combined aggregate demand—monetary
reaction function equation, she would come up with:







These coefficients are too large to be taken seriously. However, their
size (but not their sign) is clearly an artifact of the model. The co-
efficients on and t—2 are highly correlated, and the introduction
of a supply shock or of serial correlation in the demand shock would
quickly bring them down to more reasonable values —theirlarge size in (32)
is due to the fact that the difference between and carries
lots of information about .Itis interesting to note that (31)
and (32) might be rewritten as:
= +
(34) = ]Yt—l+rr2p2+
whichbear a close resemblance to Taylor's (5) and (7):
=•88+
(36) =_1.O3tl+ 73t—2
Therefore we conclude that Taylor's empirical findings are neither evidence
for nor evidence against the hypothesis that an increase in persistence
has led to an increase in stability. By assuming that the size of the
shocks is independent of the structure of the model, he can reach one
conclusion. By specifying a different underlying model —onethat stresses
the role of variations in the real interest rate in producing variations
—59—in the real interest rate in producing variations in output —theopposite
18/
conclusions emerge
It is a striking feature of Taylor's structural analysis that in
explaining the changes in cyclical patterns between the World War I period
and the present one, he finds that all the structural parameters in his
model change. Particularly surprising are his conclusions about monetary
policy. He finds that it has become less accommodative'under the current fiat
money regime than it was under the earlier gold standard. He attributes
the looseness of short run monetary policy under the gold standard to the
effects of foreign price shocks which should have led to specie inflows.
There are at least two important flaws in this argument. First, it is
implausible that, at a time when imports represented only about six per-
cent of GNP, foreign price shocks were the principal source of inflation
shocks, especially using the GNP deflator to measure prices. Second, analyses
of the gold standard surveyed in Bordo and Schwartz (1984), have made it clear
that short—run specie flows in response to price shocks were negligible
during the gold standard period. There thus seems to be little evidence
for the monetary policy assumptions necessary to drive Taylor's conclusions.
Reduced Form Evidence: Theory
In this sub—section we present some empirical evidence to back the
hypothesis that price rigidity has contributed to macro—economic stability.
We had hoped to estimate a simple structural model, and thus to test
whether the data supported our hypothesis by testing whether the parameters
18/Taylor's finding that output is a decreasing function of past inflation
is not evidence that the positive effect —throughthe real interest
rate —ofinflation on output is small. For Taylor's negative coefficient
is for an equation that is itself not structural, that is a combination
of the aggregate demand equation and the monetary policy reaction function.
—60—of the structural model fell in a region in which aggregate price flexibility
was destabilizing on the margin. But we are unable to do so. Attempts
at estimation repeatedly failed to converge or converged to unstable para-
meter values. We appear to have been unable to nest our hypothesis in
a structural model which is both tractable, in the sense of being simple
enough for us to gain some analytic understanding of its properties, and
believable, in the sense of not being rejected out of hand by the data.
Since the restrictions we found necessary to formulate a model
that we could understand and interpret served also to destroy the fit of
the model with the data, we shifted to non—structural estimation. The
current practice among economists seeking to draw conclusions that are
not highly sensitive to minor changes in the underlying model is to use
vector autoregressions and to plot the resulting impulse response functions.
In such an analysis, a positive response of output to an inflation shock
might be taken as evidence in favor of our approach.
We have run analyses along these lines, but find problems in
interpreting the impulse response functions as evidence for any position
since we have no good idea what an ttinflation shock" is, what actual
economic processes it represents. Therefore we also present (quasi—)
reduced forms for output, and argue that the pattern of coefficients that
emerges is hard to justify with any underlying theoretical model other
than our hypothesis.
According to the mainstream Keynesian macro—economic approaches,
the primary determinants of output are three: lagged output, (lagged)
real money balances —operatingthrough wealth and liquidity effects —
andthe nominal interest rate. Lower real money balances choke off
aggregate demand in general, and higher nominal interest rates reduce
—61—the demand for investment goods in particular. Whether one believes
that rea:Lbalances are only a passive indicator of nominal interest rates,
credit conditions, and animal spirits; or that interest rates are only
an index of the underlying determinant, real balances; it remains true
that output should be, in any kind of reduced form, a positive function
of (present and) lagged real balances and a negative function of (present
and) lagged interest rates.
Implicit in the mainstream view is a "Keynesian" picture of
price adjustment. Changes in real balances or nominal interest rates
cause disturbances in aggregate demand. Because in the aggregate quantity
adjusts more quickly than price, the changes in the movement of the price
level associated with changes in real balances and in interest rates
show up —inthe time period relevant to the study of business cycles —
onlyafter the movement in output. In the mainstream view, the price
level responds to its own lagged values and to the level of nominal
demand. The mainstream view cannot account for a significant positive
link running from prices to output without abandoning the "Keynesian"
interpretation of the relative speeds of price and quantity adjustment
that is its foundation. There is one set of events which, according to
the mainstream view, should generate a correlation between present price
movements and future output. This is the case of the "supply shock," in
which present jumps in prices are associated with declines in future output.
But this produces a correlation with the opposite sign from that expected
according to a real interest rate centered theory.
The explanation for output fluctuations usually given by classi-
cal economists follows these lines: some agents (workers, not firms)
misperceive relative prices. They believe that the real wage is higher
—62—(or lower) than it really is and so work more (or less) than is optimal.
If there ae intermediate goods in the production process, it is possible
to claim that output depends on both the degree of relative price mis-
perception and on lagged production of intermediate goods, on lagged output.
This line of thought produces a Lucas aggregate supply function:
(37) = — Et +
Note that the new classical approach predicts that, in a reduced form of
output on lagged output, present and lagged prices, and other variables,
the only variables that can enter with positive coefficients are lagged
output. Lagged prices are useless as predictors of Pt —Etipt, and
should, in the new classical framework, not enter into the reduced form
at al1)' Therefore we conclude that a significant positive effect of
lagged prices on present output is a phenomenon that fits easily into
neither the mainstream nor the new classical view of the macroeconomy.
And we believe that the existence of such a positive effect is evidence
in favor of an older view of business cycles, a view that places special
stress on the role of the real interest rate.
With these theoretical observations in mind, we estimated vector
auto—regressions for a variety of periods and specifications on quarterly
data taken from Gordon (l982a) and annual data taken from Friedman and
Schwartz (1983). The results provide some evidence in favor of our
hypothesis. A price innovation has, looking at the impulse response
functions, a positive effect on future output. And, in the reduced form
for output, lagged price enters with a generally positive coefficient.
19/According to the new classical view of things, shocks have persistent
effects even though lagged prices are not in the equation for q .Past
prices affect past output, and past output enters the equationthat
determines present output.
—63—We find this significant. According to the view that places
stress on the importance of nominal rigidities in causing business cycles,
price innovations have to (when nominal balances are held constant) have
a negative effect on future output. Deflation should raise the real money
stock and thus increase output. But the equations indicate, in support

















in the lag operator.
which is uncorrelated with —E1q
and —E
1i will be counted as
an inflation innovation. Thus the risk that our interpretation of the
results Ia in error, that the VAR is reading correlations betweenand q
that are really driven by causal links from q toand from lagged q to q
as evidence in favor of our hypothesis, is minimized.
—64—
Empirical Results






a 3 x 3 matrix polynomial of
in this autoregression are
the output ratio, real GNP/natural real GNP
the quarter—to—quarter inflation rate
the commercial paper rate. All data are taken from
Gordon (1982a).
Note that the arrangement of the variables in the VAR is such as
to minimize the potential impact of any innovation in p. Only that part of
—The VAR was initially estimated for time periods 1893:1—1915—4,
1923:1—1940—4, and 1949:1—1982—4. This particular three—variable system
was chosen because there is no quarterly data on the money stock available
before 1907. Thus, there are not enough data to estimate a VAR including
the money stock for any pre—Worid War I period. We are reluctant to base
any arguments on a comparison of the post—World War II period with the
interwar period alone. The Great Depression represents an extraordinary
cumulation of shocks and so is probably not well studied using the VAR
methodology.
An objection to estimating this particular system might be made
along the following lines: the choice of variables —output,inflation,
and interest rates —impliesthat the effects attributed to the inflation
variable are only the effects of movements in accomodated inflation.
Unaccomodated movements in inflation will, because the interest rate is
an index of the real money stock, also appear as movements in interest
rates. And so some of the depressing effect of price rises on output
will appear as an effect of interest rate movements on output.
Two facts militate against this argument. First, it implies
that the contemporaneous correlation between inflation and interest
rates should be positive, that "013 should be greater than zero. Instead,
"013 is less than zero (although not significantlyso).
Second, the equations were also estimated for the four equation
system consisting of inflation, the commercial paper rate, the output
ratio, and the detrended nominal money stock. The variables were so
ordered as to give the maximum potential scope to the monetary innovation,
the second place to the output innovation, the third place to the
—65—interest rate innovation, and the least potential scope to the inflation
innovation-s
Quasi reduced form equations for output are shown in Table 12.
Impulse responses of output to an inflation innovation are plotted in
Figures 5 and 6.
We note two things from these empirical results. First, this
methodology is not suited to the interwar period. The interwar period
is so strongly dominated by the Great Depression that all correlations
are warped: the decline of the nominal interest rate during the onset
of the Depression is the only variable the model can latch onto to account
for the depression, hence the excessively large difference in the coefficients
on the first and second lag of the interest rate. If one turns back to
Figure 2, this should come as no surprise. The Great Depression was a
unique event, and attempts to analyze the entire interwar period are, in
essence, attempts to generalize from a sample of one.
Second, both the coefficients on lagged inflation in the output
equation and the impulse responses of output to an inflation shock are
positive and, in general, significant at at least the .90 level. This
correlation is not easy to explain within either the new classical
framework or the mainstream framework. The hypothesis urged here with its
emphasis on real interest rate effects does provide a natural explanation.
This belief is bolstered by additional equations run (but not
reported). For various combinations of interest rates, inflation rates,
output ratios, real and nominal money stocks, the only equationwhich
failed to generate a positive correlation between inflation innovations
and future output and positive terms on lagged prices in the output












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(Noutput ratio, inflation, and the nominal money stock. Furthermore, the
effect of lagged inflation innovations on output is significantly greater
for the four—variable system for those two post—World War II periods
which do not include the supply—shock ridden l970s. This tends to support
of our hypothesis. The 1970s were dominated by supply shocks, by dis-
turbances that first raisedand then reduced q. These shifts in the
short run aggregate supply schedule should mask the effects we are looking
ror in crie post—world war IL period. me tact tnat tnese suppiy snocics
do reduce the positive effect for the period 1949:1—1982—4, and that this
masking is only partial encourages us to think that we are correctly
interpreting our VARs and that the effect of price innovations is, in the
United States today, strongly procyclical.
To sum up: an unstructured analysis of the correlations between
macro—economic variables carried out by means of VAR5 produces a finding —
inflationinnovations have a positive effect on future output —thatis
hard to interpret from either an equilibrium business cycle or a nominal
rigidities perspective. We cannot think of other convincing reasons
for this association besides the one we advocate: changes in the aggregate
price level produce changes in the real cost of capital which have effects
on the level of expenditures on items that have a high interest elasticity
of present value. Thus deflation at the beginning of a recession would
deepen the recession by causing a further cutback in investment. This
correlation suggests reducing nominal price rigidity would not diminish the
seriousness of business cycles.
—70—V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper began by suggesting that the large change in the
variance of output between the pre— and post—War periods was a fact that
should be explicicable within a satisfactory business cycle theory.
We then argued that a number of factors frequently alleged to have led
to greater stability including structural changes in the economy, dis-
cretionary stabilization policy and the avoidance of financial panics,
probably contributed relatively little to enhanced stability. We conclude
that the two principal factors promoting economic stability have been
greater public and private efforts to smooth consumption and the increasing
rigidity of prices. We attribute the latter development to the increasing
institutionalization of the economy.
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